A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

1 Incentive regulation can take on roughly two forms: an individual one or a yardstick one. More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. Laffont and Tirole (1993, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) introduced 'favorableness' to compare two distribu. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. 1) INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW TO REGULATE? In individual 1, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. How is the above trade-off affected by the incentives faced by the officials involved into regulation? An advanced textbook on regulation is. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation.